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Introduction1 
1. It is a great pleasure to have been asked to give the Pilgrim Fathers Lecture, particularly 
in a year so rich in anniversaries. This is a most prestigious annual lecture. The previous 
lecturers include some of the most distinguished jurists of our time.     
 
2. There have been so many anniversaries to choose from this year. Who can be unaware 
that it is the 800th anniversary of Magna Carta, a document that was the product of a local 
dispute between tyrannous King John and his truculent barons, and which has contributed 
greatly to the development of the rule of law both here and throughout the democratic world?  
It is also the 200th anniversary of the Plymouth Law Society whose first president was Henry 
Woollcombe. It must be particularly satisfying for the Society that your current President, 
Charles Parry, is one of his successors in the firm Woollcombe Yonge.2 The importance of 
maintaining a strong independent legal profession locally cannot be overstated; and a 
profession that is strong and independent locally is all the better equipped to operate 
effectively on the international stage.  
 
3. Plymouth is a city that embodies the idea that what happens on the local scene can have 
effects globally. It was their persecution for rejecting the Church of England that impelled the 
Pilgrim Fathers to sail from Plymouth on 16 September 1620 in search of a better life in what 
                                                 
1 I wish to thank John Sorabji for all his help in preparing this lecture. 
2 See <http://www.plymouthherald.co.uk/New-Plymouth-Law-Soc-president-mark-organisation/story-
25897856-detail/story.html>. 
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is now known as New England. Nearly four hundred years later, individuals from across the 
world still move from one place to another in search of a better life, many of them fleeing 
persecution. 2015 has been a particularly harrowing year for those seeking asylum in safe 
countries. Who cannot be moved by the daily sight on our television screens of large 
numbers of civilians seeking to escape from the violence to which they have been subjected 
in their home countries? The movement of individuals from one country to another is now 
governed by increasingly complex rules of domestic and international law. The globalisation 
of the law is a development of the 20th and 21st centuries. It is of importance to all of us.  In 
the light of current events, I propose to start with asylum law. 
4. On 28 July 1951 the United Nations adopted the Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees (the Refugee Convention). The inspiration for it was, in the words of Ruud Lubbers 
and Anders B. Johnson, the acknowledgment by the international community of the need to 
 ‘deal with the aftermath of World War II’ and of ‘the strong global commitment to 
 ensuring that the displacement and trauma caused by the persecution and destruction of 
 the war years would not be repeated.’3 It is a treaty that has ‘become known as the 
 Magna Carta of international refugee law’.4  
 
5. The interpretation of the Refugee Convention falls in the first place on the domestic 
courts of the signatories.  There are now almost 150 such parties.  They have diverse 
judicial systems and cultures.  It is inevitable that there will be differences of approach 
between them as to the interpretation and application of the Convention. 
 
6. There are two principal ways in which the signatories can diverge from each other in 
their interpretation of it. The first is by their own domestic legislation. The second is by the 
interpretative process itself. I propose to say nothing about the first of these. But the second 
lies at the heart of what I want to discuss today. 
 
7. The rules governing the interpretation of international treaties are to be found in articles 
31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The essential rule is contained 
in article 31(1) which provides that a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the 
light of its object and purpose. The alluring simplicity and obvious good sense of this are 
deceptive.   
                                                 
3 Foreword to Refugee Protection: A Guide to International Refugee Law 
<http://www.ipu.org/pdf/publications/refugee_en.pdf> 
4 Cited by R. Wilkinson, Refugees (2001) Vol. 2 (No. 123) at 2 
<http://www.unhcr.org/3b5e90ea0.html>. 
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8. A good example of the problem is to be found in the meaning of the word “refugee” in 
article 1A(2) in relation to persecution by non-state agents.  In the case of Adan v Secretary 
of State for the Home Department [2001] 2 WLR 143, the applicants challenged a certificate 
issued by the Secretary of State authorising their return to Germany or France as safe third 
countries where their asylum claims would be determined in accordance with the 
Convention. The basis of the challenge was that Germany and France failed to recognise 
persecution by non-state agents as qualifying for protection under the Convention, at least if 
the state was not itself complicit in the persecution. It was contended that the French and 
German interpretation of a “refugee” was wrong, so that they were not countries to which the 
applicants could lawfully be returned. The House of Lords decided that it had to inquire into 
the meaning of the Convention approached as an international instrument and to determine 
the “autonomous” meaning of the relevant provisions of the treaty. It had to be given an 
independent meaning derivable from the text of the Convention as well as the sources 
mentioned in articles 31 and 32 and without taking colour from the distinctive features of the 
legal system of any individual contracting state. As a matter of principle, there could only be 
one true meaning of a treaty. It was true that article 38 provides that, if there is disagreement 
as to the meaning of the Convention, it can be resolved by the International Court of Justice.  
That court, however, had never been asked to make such a ruling and the prospect of a 
reference to it was remote. In practice, therefore, it was left to national courts, faced with a 
material disagreement on an issue of interpretation, to resolve it. And that is precisely what 
the House did. It explained why the French and German interpretation was wrong. France 
and Germany were not, therefore, safe countries where the applicants’ claims would be 
determined in accordance with the Convention.   
 
9. Another problem area has been the meaning of “persecuted” which is an integral part of 
the definition of “refugee” in article 1A(2). This has arisen in a significant number of cases. 
The problem is that the Convention itself does not shed any light on the meaning of 
“persecution”, but the UNHCR Handbook does. In Adan, Lord Steyn pointed out that under 
articles 35 and 36 of the Convention (and under article II of the 1967 Protocol), the UNHCR 
plays a critical role in the application of the Convention. Contracting States are obliged to co-
operate with the UNHCR. It is, therefore, not surprising that the UNHCR Handbook, although 
not binding on states, has high persuasive authority and is much relied on by domestic 
courts and tribunals. 
 
10. In Sepet v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] 1 WLR 856, the House of 
Lords had to consider whether refugee status should be accorded to Turkish Kurds who 
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claimed asylum in the UK on the ground that, if they were returned to Turkey, they would be 
liable to perform compulsory military service on pain of imprisonment if they refused.  The 
House examined the leading international instruments to see whether they provided any 
support for the applicants’ case. These included the UNHCR Handbook, the General 
Comment No 22 of the UN Human Rights Committee, the 1996 Joint Position Statement, the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and the draft directive of the EU (the forerunner of 
the Qualifications Directive). This material did not show a clear international recognition of 
the right for which the applicants contended. The House then considered whether the 
applicants’ case found compelling support in the jurisprudence of other jurisdictions.  It 
concluded that, although there were indications of changed thinking among a minority of 
members of the European Commission, there was as yet no authority to support the 
applicants’ case. The claim was, therefore, rejected.  
 
11. Sepet is an interesting example of the techniques deployed by a national court in 
seeking to find the true interpretation of the Convention. The starting point is the Vienna 
Convention, but that is only the starting point. It examines relevant international instruments 
to see whether they provide a clear indication of the answer to the question at issue.  Having 
regard to the central role of the UNHCR, the Handbook is of particular importance. It also 
considers what leading academic writers have to say. Finally, it has regard to the decisions 
by courts of other jurisdictions. There is a growing corpus of case-law from a significant 
number of national courts on the interpretation of the Convention. In the UK, we have drawn 
heavily on the jurisprudence of the courts of Australia, New Zealand and Canada. 
 
12. An interesting and difficult question is: by what criteria does a national court decide 
whether to adopt the views of academic writers or the decisions of other national courts? In 
our courts at least, a passage from a textbook or a judgment in a foreign case is often cited 
to reinforce a conclusion that has already been reached by independent detailed reasoning. 
Sometimes, however, the passage sets out reasoning which the judge considers to be so 
compelling that he or she simply adopts it. The willingness of judges to borrow from each 
other is now an accepted and, in my view, welcome fact of judicial life. There is much that 
we can learn from each other, and not merely in relation to the interpretation of international 
treaties. In recent years, the development of the common law of England has benefited 
hugely from decisions of courts of other common law jurisdictions.   
 
13. But to return to the Convention, what Roger Haines said in a paper in 1995 
(“International Judicial Co-operation in Asylum Laws. Suggestions for the future”) should 
surely be of universal application. He said that it is a question of seeking out the best of 
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overseas refugee jurisprudence. He gave as an example the meaning of the requirement 
that the fear of persecution be “well-founded” and the standard of proof that an applicant 
must satisfy. He referred to a number of formulations of the test adopted in different 
jurisdictions, included “a reasonable possibility” (US Supreme Court), “a reasonable degree 
of likelihood ((UK House of Lords) and “a real chance” (High Court Australia). Having 
reviewed these alternatives, the New Zealand Court of Appeal preferred the “real chance” 
test because it considered that it was more readily capable of comprehension and 
application by sometimes harassed decision-makers.  
 
14. Mr Haines warned (rightly in my view) that, if we are increasingly to borrow what we 
perceive to be the best refugee jurisprudence from other states, we must be aware of the 
domestic law setting and the considerations which may have influenced that state’s 
jurisprudence. For example, there is much in the Canadian cases law which is driven by the 
imperatives of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, especially in relation to 
procedural fairness.   
 
15. I would now like to examine two fairly recent and striking decisions of the UK Supreme 
Court which considered whether the claimants were refugees within the meaning of the 
Refugee Convention. I have to confess that I wrote judgments in both cases.  These are HJ 
(Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department  [2011] AC 596 and RT (Zimbabwe) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] 1 AC 152. As we shall see, in both 
decisions the Supreme Court drew on comparative jurisprudence on the Convention. 
 
16. Let me start with HJ (Iran). This appeal concerned two cases.  Both appellants were gay 
men.  HJ was an Iranian who arrived in the UK in 2001 and claimed asylum on arrival. HT 
was a Cameroonian who arrived in the UK in 2007, having travelled on a false passport. He 
claimed asylum on his arrest at Gatwick airport. Both appellants asserted that they had a 
well-founded fear that they would be persecuted if they were returned to their countries of 
origin. The central question in both appeals was whether the claimants were refugees within 
the meaning of article 1A(2) of the Convention which defines a refugee as an individual who:  
 ‘owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
 nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the 
 country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to avail 
 himself of the protection of that country . . .’ 
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17. Both asylum claims were rejected by the Secretary of State. Challenges to these refusals 
were rejected by our lower courts. The question for the Supreme Court was succinctly stated 
by Lord Rodger in these terms:  
 ‘A gay man applies for asylum in this country. The Secretary of State is satisfied that, 
 if he returns to his country of nationality and lives openly as a homosexual, the 
 applicant will face a real and continuing prospect of being beaten up, or flogged, or 
 worse. But the Secretary of State is also satisfied that, if he returns, then, because of 
 these dangers of living openly, he will actually carry on any homosexual relationships 
 “discreetly” and so not come to the notice of any thugs or of the authorities. Is the 
 applicant a “refugee” for purposes of the United Nations Convention relating to the 
 Status of Refugees 1951 (“the Convention”)? . . .’5 
 
18. In other words, can a gay man, who would have a well-founded fear of persecution if he 
were to live openly as a gay man on return to his home country, be said to have a well-
founded fear of persecution if on return he would in fact live discreetly, thereby probably 
escaping the attention of those who might harm him if they were aware of his sexual 
orientation? At first sight, it might be thought that, if the sexual orientation of the asylum 
seeker would not in fact come to the attention of anyone, it is impossible to see how he could 
be said to have a fear, let alone a well-founded fear, of persecution on the ground of his 
sexual orientation. 
 
19. But the Secretary of State did not go so far as to contend that there are no 
circumstances in which an asylum-seeker could have a well-founded fear of persecution if 
he or she were to take measures to avoid detection on return. Her case was that, if the 
measures that an asylum-seeker would take on return to avoid persecution were not 
reasonably tolerable, then that of itself would amount to persecution. But provided that the 
avoiding measures were reasonably tolerable, there could be no well-founded fear of 
persecution. 
 
20. The Supreme Court rejected the reasonable tolerability test. It was unworkable and 
wrong in principle. It was based on a misunderstanding of two previous authorities, one of 
which was a decision of the High Court of Australia. There was no support for it in any 
previous jurisprudence.  
 
                                                 
5 Ibid at [40]. 
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21. It decided that the claimants had a well-founded fear of persecution notwithstanding the 
fact that they would lead discreet lives if they were returned. The language of Article 1A(2) 
itself did not provide the answer to the problem.  But the court reached its conclusion by 
interpreting the Convention in a principled way having regard to its purpose and intendment.  
The key point was that the underlying rationale of the Convention compelled the conclusion 
that gay men should be able to live freely and openly as gay men without fearing that they 
may suffer harm of the requisite intensity or duration because they are gay. The country of 
nationality does not meet the requisite standard of protection from persecution simply 
because conditions in the country are such that a gay asylum-seeker would be able to take, 
and would in fact take, steps to avoid persecution by concealing the fact that he is gay. 
As Lord Rodger put it, 
 ‘The underlying rationale of the Convention is… that people should be able to live 
 freely without fear that they may suffer harm of the requisite intensity or duration 
 because they are, say, black, or the descendants of some former dictator, or gay. In 
 the absence of any indication to the contrary, the implication is that they must be free 
 to live openly in this way without the fear of persecution. By allowing them to live 
 openly and free from that fear, the receiving state affords them the protection which 
 is a surrogate for the protection which their home state should have afforded them.’6 
 
And as I put it in my judgment,  
 ‘The Convention must be construed in the light of its object and purpose, which is to 
 protect a person who “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted...”. If the 
 price that a person must pay in order to avoid persecution is that he must conceal his 
 race, religion, nationality, membership of a social group or political opinion, then he is 
 being required to surrender the very protection that the Convention is intended to 
 secure for him. The Convention would be failing in its purpose if it were to mean that 
 a gay man does not have a well-founded fear of persecution because he could 
 conceal the fact he is a gay man in order to avoid persecution on return to his 
 home country.’7 
 
22. The court found support for this approach in some valuable Commonwealth 
jurisprudence which had considered the very issue that was before the court. The High Court 
of Australia decision of Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration (2003) 216 CLR 473 
was the subject of sustained analysis by Lord Rodger8 and described by him as “powerful 
                                                 
6 [2011] AC 596 at [53]. 
7 Ibid. at [110]. 
8 Ibid. at [66]ff. 
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authority”. In that case McHugh and Kirby JJ said that the fact that the applicants would act 
discreetly did not mean that they did not have a well-founded fear of persecution on their 
return. Rather, the tribunal had to ask why they would act discreetly. If it was because they 
would suffer serious harm if they lived openly as a homosexual couple, they would have a 
well-founded fear of persecution “since it is the right to live openly without fear of persecution 
which the Convention exists to protect”.    
 
23. Asking why an asylum-seeker would act discreetly focuses the court’s attention on the 
reason why the individual has acted discreetly in the past, and would have to do so in the 
future. As McHugh and Kirby JJ explained, 
 ‘In many – perhaps the majority of – cases, however, the applicant has acted in the 
 way that he or she did only because of the threat of harm. In such cases, the well-
 founded fear of persecution held by the applicant is the fear that, unless that person 
 acts to avoid the harmful conduct, he or she will suffer harm. It is the threat of 
 serious harm with its menacing implications that constitutes the persecutory 
 conduct.’9 
 
24. By asking why he would act discreetly, the attention of the court is focused on what 
would happen to the individual if he did not act discreetly on his return. Was discretion the 
means by which he would hope to avoid persecution? If yes, was the fear of persecution that 
the individual hoped to avoid by so acting well-founded? If yes, the individual had a well-
founded fear of persecution within the meaning of the Convention. This leads to a further 
consideration, also noted by McHugh and Kirby JJ. An individual who dissimulates may 
successfully avoid coming to the attention of the authorities. But he will still be in fear of 
persecution, fearfully waiting for a knock at the door.10 Throughout the period when is 
seeking to evade detection, he continues to be in fear of persecution. As Madgwick J said in 
Win v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Attains (2001) FCA 132 at [18], to say 
otherwise would stand the Refugee Convention on its head and one would be driven to say: 
‘Anne Frank, terrified as a Jew and hiding for her life in Nazi-occupied Holland would not be 
a refugee.’11 
 
25. Lord Rodger noted that the reasoning of McHugh and KirbyJJ had been applied in NABD 
of 2002 v Minister of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 79 AJR 
1142. This case concerned the question whether the appellant who had converted to 
                                                 
9 Cited at ibid [66]. 
10 Ibid. at [116]. 
11 Cited ibid. at [117]. 
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Christianity would face persecution if he returned to Iran. It had also been applied in SZATV 
v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 233 CLR 18, where the appellant, a 
journalist from Ukraine had been subject to a campaign of harassment on account of his 
political views. It had been held by the lower court that he could safely return to Ukraine, not 
as a journalist, but as a construction worker who kept his political beliefs to himself. The High 
Court of Australia overturned this decision: it had focused on what steps the appellant would 
take to avoid persecution rather than why he would take them. As Lord Rodger explained, 
the decision was predicated on the journalist having to give up ‘the very right to express his 
political views without fear of persecution which the Convention was designed to protect.’12  
26. The Supreme Court noted that the courts in New Zealand had reached a similar 
conclusion on the issue, but on the basis of a somewhat different analysis. On this analysis, 
which is explained in the leading case of Refugee Appeal No 74665/03 [2005] INLR 68, the 
emphasis is on the fact that refugee status cannot be denied to a person who on return 
would forfeit a fundamental human right in order to avoid persecution. As I noted in my 
judgment, in agreement with Lord Rodger, the attraction of this approach is that it gives due 
weight to the fact that the Convention must be interpreted  
 “in accordance with its broad humanitarian objective and having regard to the 
 principles, expressed in the preamble, that human beings should enjoy fundamental 
 rights and freedoms without discrimination and that refugees should enjoy the widest 
 possible exercise of these rights and freedoms’.13  
 
27. It can, therefore, be seen that the Supreme Court drew heavily on Commonwealth 
jurisprudence in determining a difficult question of interpretation which had not previously 
been considered at the highest level in the UK courts. In rejecting the reasonable tolerability 
test which had been proposed by the Secretary of State and accepted by the Court of 
Appeal, I noted that this test had found no support in other jurisprudence. This was important 
“in view of the implicit rejection of it in a number of other jurisdictions, including at least 
Australia and New Zealand” and “the fact that it was desirable as far as possible that there 
should be international consensus on the meaning of the Convention”. Attempting to achieve 
international consensus is perhaps a more realistic ambition for domestic courts than striving 
to find the single autonomous meaning of the Convention which, as we have seen, was the 
goal set by the House of Lords in Adan.    
 
28. The question that arose in RT (Zimbabwe) was: is it an answer to a refugee claim by an 
individual who has no political views and who therefore does not support the persecutory 
                                                 
12 Ibid. at [71]. 
13 Ibid. at [113]. 
Plymouth Law and Criminal Justice Review (2016) 1 
 
10 
 
regime in his home country to say that he would lie and simulate loyalty to that regime in 
order to avoid the persecutory ill-treatment to which he would otherwise be subjected?   
 
29. RT and KM had no political views. They neither supported nor opposed the Zimbabwean 
regime. But anyone who was unable to demonstrate loyalty to the regime was at risk of 
persecution. Their case was that they had a well-founded fear that they would be 
persecuted, because they would lie and pretend to support the regime solely in order to 
avoid the persecution that they would suffer if they did not demonstrate their loyalty to the 
regime. In other words, this was a case analogous to HJ (Iran).    
30. There was no doubt that the HJ (Iran) principle applies to any person who does have 
political beliefs and who would be obliged to (and would) conceal them to avoid the 
persecution that he would suffer if he were to reveal them. The central question was whether 
the right to hold no political beliefs (and say so) attracts Convention protection as much as 
the right to hold and express political beliefs. The starting point for the analysis was the 
emphasis placed by the Convention on human rights. The court agreed with the important 
principle (a point made in the New Zealand authorities by reference to the preamble to the 
Convention) that human beings shall enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms without 
discrimination. We noted that this was reflected in European Union legislation, and that the 
right to freedom of thought, opinion and expression recognised in international and 
European human rights law protects non-believers as well as believers, and extends to the 
freedom not to hold beliefs as well as to hold them and the freedom not to express opinion 
as well as to express them.14 The same principled approach had been taken in 
jurisprudence drawn from the United States and from South Africa.15  
 
31. The Supreme Court referred to Justice Jackson’s judgment in West Virginia State Board 
of Education v Barnette: 
 ‘If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or 
 petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other 
 matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If 
 there are any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now occur to 
 us.’16 
 
This celebrated statement may well have been inspired first by the Mayflower Compact, 
which foreshadowed the United States’ Constitution, and secondly by the fundamental rights 
                                                 
14 [2013] 1 AC 152 at [29]ff. 
15 See [2013] 1 AC 152 at [37]ff. 
16 (1943) 319 US 624, 642. 
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expressed in the US Bill of Rights which reflected some of the enduring values enshrined in 
Magna Carta.    
 
32. The court also referred to the South African Constitutional Court decision in Christian 
Education South Africa v Minister of Education, where Sachs J said:   
 ‘There can be no doubt that the right to freedom of religion, belief and opinion in the 
 open and democratic society contemplated by the Constitution is important. The right 
 to believe or not to believe, and to act or not to act according to his or her beliefs or 
 non-beliefs, is one of the key ingredients of any person's dignity.’17 
 
The various authorities pointed in one direction: the same as that identified in HJ (Iran). As I 
explained: 
 ‘…the right not to hold the protected beliefs is a fundamental right which is 
 recognised in international and human rights law and … the Convention too … 
 Nobody should be forced to have or express a political opinion in which he does not 
 believe. He should not be required to dissemble on pain of persecution. Refugee law 
 does not require a person to express false support for an oppressive regime, any 
 more than it requires an agnostic to pretend to be a religious believer in order to 
 avoid persecution. A focus on how important the right not to hold a political or 
 religious belief is to the applicant is wrong in principle . . . 
 
 As regards the point of principle, it is the badge of a truly democratic society that 
 individuals should be free not to hold opinions. They should not be required to hold 
 any particular religious or political beliefs. This is as important as the freedom to hold 
 and (within certain defined limits) to express such beliefs as they do hold. One of the 
 hallmarks of totalitarian regimes is their insistence on controlling people's thoughts as 
 well as their behaviour. George Orwell captured the point brilliantly by his creation of 
 the sinister "Thought Police" in his novel 1984.’18 
 
33. So RT (Zimbabwe) is another example of a case where our court has reached a decision 
heavily influenced by foreign jurisprudence. It is not at all surprising that it should do this 
when interpreting an international treaty. The provisions of the treaty have an autonomous 
and, strictly speaking, single meaning. It is undesirable that national courts of parties to the 
Convention should produce different interpretations of the same provisions. If there is a more 
                                                 
17 2000 (10) BCLR 1051 at [36]. 
18 Ibid. at [42] – [43]. 
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or less consistent interpretation by the domestic courts of other signatory states of a 
provision of the Refugee Convention, then our court should be very slow to depart from it.  
 
34. This is not a satisfactory state of affairs. The situation exposed in Adan was regrettable. 
There ought to be an international court whose decisions on questions of interpretation are 
binding on the signatory states. Meanwhile, it is to be hoped that courts will apply the 
interpretation that commands majority, if not universal, support. 
 
35. I would like to conclude this lecture by making some observations about the globalisation 
of our common law. Our judges are not bound to follow the jurisprudence of the courts of 
other common law systems. But there is a growing interest in the extent to which the 
jurisprudence of other common law courts should influence the development of the common 
law here.   
 
36. There is nothing new in the idea of our common law being influenced by the law of other 
jurisdictions. Lord Denning said that advocates ought to draw the court’s attention to relevant 
commonwealth authorities just as they would authorities from England and Wales.19 This 
was not a novel idea. Take the phrase “an Englishman’s home is his castle”. It gives 
expression to the long-established principle that the State cannot enter or deprive someone 
of his property without either consent or lawful authority. The phrase originated in a case 
called Semayne’s Case in 1604.20 The ratio of the decision was that, although the King’s 
Sheriff could break and enter a property with valid lawful authority to do so, he had first to 
knock and seek consent to enter. In the course of the proceedings, Sir Edward Coke, who 
was Attorney-General at the time, said: ‘the house of every one is to him as his castle and 
fortress, as well for his defence against injury and violence as for his repose.’ It might be 
thought that Coke was relying on the famous provision in Magna Carta that no one should 
be disseised without due process of law. He was well versed in Magna Carta. In fact, the 
origin of the phrase that he used was far more ancient. The idea came from Roman law, 
specifically Gaius’s Commentaries on the Twelve Tables.21   
 
37. Coke was not alone in borrowing from Roman law. Such borrowings were relatively 
frequent in the formative years of the common law both as regards substantive law22 and 
                                                 
19 Lord Denning MR cited in The Supreme Court Practice 1999 (Sweet & Maxwell) (1999) Vol. 1 at 
1480. 
20 (1604) 5 Coke Rep. 91. 
21 J. Frank, Civil Law Influences on the Common Law - Some Reflections on "Comparative" and 
"Contrastive" Law, 104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 887 1955-1956 at 888. 
22 E. Re, The Roman Contribution to the Common Law, 29 Fordham L. Rev. 447 (1961) at 470. 
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procedure.23 Equity, the great product of the medieval period, owed much to Europe. Coke’s 
successor as Chief Justice, Lord Mansfield, is famous for having drawn inspiration from 
Roman law, from mercantile law, and from European jurists, as has been most recently 
demonstrated by Norman Poser in his excellent biography of Mansfield’s life and career.24 
These foreign influences did not come to an end with Mansfield. A more recent example is to 
be found in the 1984 judgment of Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister 
for the Civil Service.25 This case concerned the question whether civil servants working at 
GCHQ could lawfully be banned from joining a trade union. The basis of the ban was said to 
be national security. In the course of his judgment in the House of Lords, Lord Diplock 
adverted to the ‘principle of proportionality’. This is a concept that is well-established in our 
law today.  But it was not so at that time. Lord Diplock presciently said that English law might 
adopt the principle at some time in the future. He noted that it was recognised in the 
administrative law of several of our fellow members of the European Economic 
Community.26 Since then, under the influence of EU law and the European Convention on 
Human Rights, the principle has gradually assumed a central position in our law.      
 
38. In 1962 in Smith v Leech Brain & Co Ltd Lord Parker LCJ said that “it is important that 
the common law, and the development of the common law, should be homogeneous in the 
various sections of the Commonwealth.’27 A good example of a common law decision by a 
foreign court influencing our law is Bazley v Curry 174 DLR (4th) 45, a decision of the 
Canadian Supreme Court. The issue that arose here in Lister v Hesley Hall [2002] AC 215 
was whether the owners of a boarding house were vicariously liable for the sexual abuse of 
its residents committed by the warden it had employed. The Court of Appeal had followed a 
previous English authority and held that the warden’s acts could not be regarded as an 
unauthorised mode of carrying out his authorised duties. His employer was, therefore, not 
vicariously liable for them. The previous authority was criticised in the Canadian case. The 
House of Lords in Lister agreed. Lord Steyn said that he had been “greatly assisted by the 
luminous and illuminating judgments of the Canadian Supreme Court in Bazley”. He said 
that wherever such problems are considered in the future in the common law world these 
judgments will be the starting point. The new test was to ask whether the employee’s torts 
were so closely connected with his employment that it would be fair and just to hold the 
employers vicariously liable. This test has now taken root here. It might not have done so but 
                                                 
23 Vinogradoff, Reason and Conscience in Sixteenth-Century Jurisprudence, (24) Law Quarterly 
Review (1908) 373 
24 N. Poser, Lord Mansfield: Justice in the Age of Reason, (McGill) (2013). 
25 [1985] AC 374. 
26 Ibid at 410, discussed in J. Laws ibid at 60 – 61. 
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for the compelling reasoning of the judgments in the Canadian decision. I should, however, 
say that the appropriateness of the test was the subject of argument in two recent cases in 
which I was involved in the Supreme Court: Mohamud v WM Morrison Supermarket Plc and 
Cox v Ministry of Justice. Judgment is awaited.   
 
39. More recently in FHR European Ventures LLP & Ors v Cedar Capital Partners LLC, 
having considered decisions from, for example, Australia, Lord Neuberger noted that, while it 
was inevitable that the common law would develop in different ways in different common law 
jurisdictions, it remained ‘highly desirable for all those jurisdictions to learn from each other, 
and at least to lean in favour of harmonising the development of the common law round the 
world.’28  
 
40. We are living in an increasingly interdependent world. Jurists read each other’s 
judgments with ease on the internet. They meet at international conferences to discuss 
issues of common interest. The good sense of learning from each other and taking the best 
that each of us has to offer is now well appreciated. And this is not limited to influencing the 
development of the common law. In the field of civil procedure, we have borrowed ideas 
relating to the proper management of expert evidence from Australia and New Zealand. We 
have exported to them the principle of proportionality in the conduct of civil litigation. And 
influences are not limited to common law jurisdictions. Thus, for example, changes to our 
procedural law here have influenced reform in Norway. In the late 1990s we introduced a 
process whereby the court, rather than litigants, were responsible for the management of 
litigation. The Norwegian Dispute Act of 2005 adopted that very approach. They drew their 
inspiration from our reforms.  
 
41. There are many other examples of such influences and effects. Many more than I can 
give this evening. What I hope I have done however is to give a flavour of just how 
relationship between national laws and how national jurisdictions can and have influenced 
each other.  
 
Conclusion 
42. More than 60 years after the Refugee Convention was signed, it continues to give rise to 
difficult questions of interpretation. In the absence of a final international court dedicated to 
giving authoritative decisions on these questions, the courts of the signatories have to do 
their best to resolve them. As I have shown, they learn from and influence each other. In 
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many areas, a common understanding of the meaning of the principal provisions has been 
reached. It is to be hoped that in the same way a common understanding of problems not 
yet resolved will emerge in the future. 
 
43. As regards the development of the common law, we have seen that our courts are open 
to the influence of other jurisdictions. This does not mean that we slavishly adopt or follow 
the decisions of those jurisdictions. We scrutinise and analyse their decisions in the light of 
our own experience, culture and social and economic conditions. As has been said, ‘the 
common law’s genius’ is the ability to ‘(refine) principle over time’.29 We continue to do so in 
the light of decisions and developments from abroad, and we continue to influence those 
developments.    
 
 
                                                 
29 J. Laws, The Common Law Constitution (2014) at 9. 
